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Employment Law 
Employer Prerogative and Employee ~ghts: 
The Never-Ending Tug-of-War 
Henry L. Chambers, Jr.* 
l. INTRODUCTION 
Where there are employees and employers, there will be employment 
relationships in need of mending. That reality is enough to guarantee that 
employment law will always be a warm, if not hot, area of the law. The article 
and notes on employment law in this issue demonstrate that the development of 
employment law continues apace. 
Professor Michael Hayes's article1 reviews numerous National Labor 
Relations Board ("Board") cases and court cases to determine how evidence of 
pretext is used to assess whether an employer's asserted reasons for firing an 
employee were genuine or pretext for illegal antiunion motive. In an attempt to 
bring order to the Board's numerous positions regarding evidence of pretext, 
Professor Hayes examines the various types of evidence of pretext, noting that 
because evidence comes in various strengths it should be used in different ways 
and have different implications. He urges the Board to specify the appropriate 
uses of evidence of pretext to present a consistent vision of what qualifies as 
proof of pretext. 
The notes provide an analysis of an Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
decision and two Missouri appellate court cases addressing three employment 
issues: how an employer must discharge its duty to provide reasonable 
accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA")/ how fraud 
claims interact with the employment at-will doctrine, and under what 
circumstances mental stress can support workers' compensation recovery. 
Jill Kingsbury's student note3 examines an employer's duty to engage in the 
interactive process of determining what a reasonable accommodation is under 
the ADA. Analyzing an Eighth Circuit case4 in which the employer declined to 
participate in the process of determining what a reasonable accommodation 
would be for a previously successful employee who had suffered a disability as 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia. 
1. Michael J. Hayes, Has Wright Line Gone Wrong? Why Pretext Can Be 
Sufficient to Prove Discrimination Under the National Labor Relations Act, 64 Mo. L. 
REV. 883 (2000). 
2. 42 u.s.c. §§ 12101-12113 (1994). 
3. Jill S. Kingsbury, Note, "Must We Talk About That Reasonable 
Accommodation?": The Eighth Circuit Says Yes, But is the Answer Reasonable?, 64 
Mo. L. REV. 967 (2000). 
4. See Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 188 F.3d 944 (8th Cir. 1999). 
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a result of a car accident, Ms. Kingsbury explores whether ADA liability should 
flow from the mere refusal to engage in the process or should follow only after 
a plaintiff proves that the process could have yielded a reasonable 
accommodation. 
James Meadows's student note5 examines the nature of employment at-will 
and concludes that a recent Missouri state appellate court decision6 improperly 
authorized recovery for a fraud claim that stemmed from a refusal to employ 
after an alleged offer of employment. The decision analyzed the possibility of 
recovery for a plaintiff who spent time and money to prepare himself for a new 
job that he alleged had been offered to him, but which was withdrawn before he 
started work. Mr. Meadows notes the difficulty in detennining whether fraud 
claims are sufficiently separate from the underlying at-will employment to be 
actionable or are so related to the underlying at-will employment that they are 
barred by the at-will employment doctrine. 
Natalie Riley's student note7 analyzes a recent Missouri state appellate court 
decision8 to determine how much job-related mental stress is sufficient to trigger 
workers' compensation recovery. The court ruled that the proper comparison in 
determining if the stress suffered by the plaintiff was sufficiently extraordinary 
for the resulting hann to be compensable under the Missouri workers' 
compensation statute would be whether the stress suffered by the plaintiff was 
greater than that suffered by those in positions similar to plaintiffs industry-wide, 
with particular emphasis on those employed by the defendant.9 Ms. Riley 
analyzes whether this choice is appropriate. 
These works provide a good entrance into employment law, an area marked 
by profound clashes between employee rights and employer prerogative and 
between the employer's right to defme a job and the government's right to 
regulate the employment relationship. 
ll. FEDERALEMPLOYMENTSTATUTES 
The National Labor Relations Act (''NLRA"Y0 and ADA limit employer 
prerogative and provide job protection to employees by constraining the 
employer's prerogative to set the tenns and qualifications for continued 
employment. For example, the NLRA prohibits employers from affecting an 
employee's employment, e.g., terminating an employee, because of the 
5. James E. Meadows, Note, Dancing Around Employment At-Will: Can Fraud 
Provide Plaintiffs a Way to Hold Their Employers Liable?, 64 Mo. L. REv. 1003 (2000). 
6. See O'Neal v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 996 S.W.2d 700 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999). 
7. Natalie D. Riley, Note, Mental-Mental Claims-Placing Limitations on 
Recovery Under Workers' Compensation for Day-to-Day Frustrations, 64 Mo. L. REV. 
1023 (2000). 
8. See Williams v. DePaul Health Ctr., 996 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999). 
9. Id. at 628. 
10. 29 u.s.c. §§ 151-169 (1994). 
2000] INTRODUCTION-EMPLOYMENT LAW 879 
employee's prounion sentiment. That limitation means that an employer has an 
incentive to create a reason for firing an employee who has been terminated 
because ofprounion sentiment. Professor Hayes's article springs from this area. 
Pretext analysis is necessary because employers attempt to exercise 
prerogative that statutes explicitly limit. Given the broad prerogative normally 
flowing from the doctrine of at-will employment, the employer's general desire 
to fire seems acceptable. Thus, Professor Hayes's article is all about determining 
when an employer has exceeded the bounded prerogative allowed by the NLRA. 
Because pretext issues arise only after the employment relationship has changed 
substantially or after the relationship has ended, pretext disputes will always be 
contentious. How evidence of pretext is treated by the Board will always be a 
highly contested issue whose resolution must consider fairness to an employee 
whose views are clearly contrary to his employer's and may have gotten him 
fired. Professor Hayes's analysis of these issues is strong and will be 
enlightening to all who must deal with knotty pretext issues. As Professor 
Hayes's article and the Supreme Court's recent case, Reeves v. Sanderson 
Plumbing Products, Inc. 11 demonstrate, pretext issues in employment will be 
extant as long as employers arguably ignore the legal restraints on employer 
prerogative. 
The ADA does not allow employers to define a job so that it may only be 
performed by an employee without a disability, unless the job must be defmed 
in that way. While the employer generally may define its jobs and their 
respective responsibilities as the employer sees fit, the ADA constrains that 
prerogative by obligating employers to engage in an interactive process that finds 
a reasonable accommodation for a worker with a disability who is generally 
qualified to do a particular job. This may require the employer to redefine 
certain aspects of its jobs in recognition of the employee's disability. For 
example, in Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc., 12 the case at issue in Ms. 
Kingsbury's note, a car accident that severely injured Ms. Fjellestad triggered 
Pizza Hut's duty to accommodate. Fjellestad had worked for Pizza Hut for more 
than twenty years and had shown herself able to perform her job successfully for 
years before her accident. At issue was Pizza Hut's refusal to accommodate Ms. 
Fjellestad. 
Assessing the appropriateness of Pizza Hut's refusal to engage in the 
accommodation process may depend both on Pizza Hut's duty under the statute 
and the timing of its decision. Because that process necessarily constrains the 
employer's prerogative, a refusal to engage in the process may appear to breach 
the employer's duty under the ADA by allowing the employer to assert 
prerogative that the statute specifically restricts. In addition, that an employer's 
action results in an employee's termination may impact how the employer's 
prerogative meshes with the employee's right. The refusal to engage in an 
11. 120 S. Ct. 2097 (2000). 
12. 188 F.3d 944 (8th Cir. 1999). 
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interactive process may appear unreasonable, or at least less reasonable than it 
would be were the result not the termination of, in Fjellestad's case, a two-
decade employment relationship. The refusal to engage in the process, might 
reflect the employer's desire to control the structure of its job but may also 
provide an impetus to hold the employer liable for the refusal to engage in the 
process even if little or no proof exists that engaging in the process would have 
yielded a reasonable accommodation. In assessing Pizza Hut's actions and the 
court's response to it, Ms. Kingsbury attempts to resolve this core clash of 
employer prerogative and employee right under the ADA. 
III. STATE EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINES 
At-will employment is the ultimate in employer prerogative and the nadir 
of employee rights. This prerogative allows the employer to construct the job 
and its requirements in any way the employer sees fit and yields no liability even 
for termination for distasteful reasons. Consequently, in 0 'Neal v. Stifel, 
Nicolaus & Co.,13 the case at issue in Mr. Meadows's note, the possibility that 
a job offer had been revoked before Mr. O'Neal began work was not inherently 
problematic, as it was clearly within the employer's prerogative. However, as 
Mr. Meadows's note makes clear, that prerogative is not unlimited. The 
employment at-will doctrine is not a defense to fraud, even when the fraud 
relates to employment. Consequently, even though damages may not flow 
directly from an employer's exercise of employment at-will rights, damages may 
flow from fraudulent behavior that merely relates to the employment. 
Attempting to distinguish an employer's nonfraudulent exercise of 
employment at-will rights from the fraudulent exercise of the same rights is at 
the heart of Mr. Meadows's note. However, fairly determining whether the 
exercise of employment at-will rights is fraudulent may appear dependent on the 
timing of such exercise. In 0 'Neal, the decision to withdraw the job offer was 
made at the beginning of the employment relationship. Thus, the exercise of the 
employment at-will doctrine, while always harsh, may have seemed most 
justified at this point in the employment relationship, i.e., before the employment 
relationship had been shaped by plaintiff's working experiences. Consequently, 
the court's unwillingness to apply the doctrine at the most justifiable time in the 
employment relationship may help explain why Mr. Meadows suggests that the 
court appeared to ignore the employment at-will doctrine and the employer's 
prerogative completely. 
Workers' compensation statutes do not explicitly limit employer 
prerogative, but implicitly do so by allowing recovery for certain harms caused 
by working. While employers are free to structure their jobs in any appropriate 
manner, workers' compensation schemes guarantee that the harm from such 
structuring will not fall directly on the employee. In Williams v. DePaul Health 
13. 996 S.W.2d 700 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999). 
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Center, 14 the case at issue in Ms. Riley's note, the court determined what level 
of job stress was sufficient to trigger recovery under Missouri's workers' 
compensation statute when that stress caused mental harm. That question is 
necessarily related to how the employer structures its jobs and the appropriate 
constraints on that structuring. 
In determining how much stress is sufficiently extraordinary to require that 
workers' compensation pay for the resulting harm, the Williams court had three 
options. First, the court could have determined that extraordinary stress was any 
stress more severe than that suffered by an average worker. Second, the court 
could have determined that extraordinary stress is that which is more severe than 
that suffered by the average worker performing plaintiffs job throughout the 
industry. Third, the court could have determined that extraordinary stress is that 
which is more severe than that suffered by the employer's average worker in the 
plaintiffs job classification. 
The court provides the least constraint on the employer's prerogative in the 
third case by equating reasonable stress with whatever stress the employer 
generally exerts on its workers. Conversely, the first and second options 
constrain the employer by suggesting that the stress all employers exert on their 
employees helps define the reasonable level of stress for any particular 
employer. Thus, the employer's exercise of prerogative in structuring its jobs, 
i.e., the definition of its job solely by its own staridards, may yield recovery 
under the workers' compensation statute. While that may not be a direct 
constraint on an employer, it might impact how an employer structures its jobs. 
In analyzing which solution or combination of solutions is most reasonable 
considering the goals of workers' compensation, Ms. Riley implicitly provides 
insight into issues of employer prerogative. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Each article in this section implicitly or explicitly explores the calibration 
of employer prerogative and employee rights in its specific context. In doing so, 
the reader will recognize that the tug-of-war between employee right and 
employer prerogative will occur even when the applicable statute or rule appears 
clear. Indeed, the battleground may be more fiercely contested because the 
applicable rules seem clear. As an employment relationship deepens, the stakes 
grow higher and the employer's responsibility to the employee may also seem 
to deepen. Thus, conflicts may become more pronounced and more difficult to 
resolve. Such is the nature of employment law. This impressive collection of 
works introduces important employment law issues and raises several issues that 
will plague employment law well into the future. 
14. 996 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999). 
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